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Europe and the impasse of centre-left politics in Turkey:
lessons from the Greek experience
ZIYA ÖNIŞ and IOANNIS N. GRIGORIADIS
Introduction
This paper aims at exploring the state of centre-left politics in Greece and Turkey by
focusing on the transformation of the two leading centre-left parties in the two
countries, the Greek Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panellinio SosialistikoKinima—
PASOK) and the Turkish Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—
CHP). Such a comparison is warranted for a number of reasons, despite size
discrepancy and religious differences between the two countries. Both Greece and
Turkey emerged from the Ottoman Empire and share to a considerable degree a
legacy of top-down and crisis-ridden modernization. In both countries, a reformist
and an underdog1 culture clashed, thus making modernization the product of the
compromise between the two. In the case of Greece, PASOK has succeeded in ruling
Greece for more than 20 years. While the party emerged in the 1970s with nationalist,
anti-imperialist third-worldist elements, it was able to gradually move to the centre
of the political spectrum in the mid-1990s and become a trigger of political reform.
This process peaked during the Simitis administration, in which Greece regained its
lost international prestige as ‘the European country of the Balkans’ and was able to
fulfil the economic criteria for its membership in the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU). While still appealing to old slogans and rhetoric, the Simitis administration
attempted to break old nationalist taboos on issues relating to Greek foreign and
security policy. The early Simitis era became an ample example of how a centre-left
party could form a greater winning social alliance, appeal to the winners of
globalization and achieve high economic growth, while not compromising its social
justice agenda. In the case of CHP, the party increasingly distanced itself from its
social democratic legacy. Failing to win political power, it was trapped into a
defensive nationalist, anti-globalization and anti-reformist political agenda spear-
headed by the question of secularism. The consolidation of Turkish democracy and
the promotion of human and minority rights lost their significance, and the CHP
emerged as Turkey’s leading nationalist and anti-reform party, questioning the
country’s European vocation and tolerating military interventions into Turkish
politics. The diminution of the CHP into a party of the ‘secularist middle class’ has
deprived it of any chances to lead a winning social coalition and lead Turkey’s
political reform. This paper will seek conclusions on the future of centre-left politics
in Turkey based on the Greek experience.
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Europeanization and the transformation of centre-left politics in Greece
The experience of German–Italian–Bulgarian occupation and an ensuing bitter
civil war shaped Cold War Greek domestic politics. Between 1946 and 1949
Greece suffered a bloody and destructive civil war between the state army and
the communist insurgents who aspired to turn Greece into a socialist republic.
The victory of the state forces in 1949 irrevocably positioned Greece in the
Western camp and set the framework in which the Greek political system would
operate in the following decades. The establishment of a pro-Western illiberal
democratic regime by the civil war winners through the 1952 Constitution
allowed for the persecution of communist intelligentsia, the polarization of Greek
society and the marginalization of the Greek Left. The threat of communist
subversion served as pretext for severe compromises in fundamental and
political rights and the operation of para-state organizations operating beyond
the rule of law. This trend was facilitated by the general Cold War climate in
countries of Southern Europe. When social democratic or centrist parties rose to
government, the military and bureaucratic establishment spearheaded by the
Palace refused to surrender the full control of the country. The 1967 coup meant
even harsher persecution of leftist political thought and interrupted the process
of Greece’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC). After the fall
of the junta in 1974, Greece’s EEC accession became the primary task of the
Karamanlis government. In this, however, Karamanlis was alone. Following a
line reminiscent of postcolonial third-worldist states, Greek socialist and leftist
parties—with the exception of the small KKE Esoterikou—fully objected to
Greece’s accession seeing such a development as a subordination of Greek
sovereignty and national interests to Western European business interests.
Andreas Papandreou, as an opposition leader, vehemently objected to the
process and vowed to withdraw Greece from the EEC once elected. It was only
after the rise of PASOK to power with the elections of 18 October 1981 that
Papandreou abandoned his anti-EEC rhetoric and accepted the integration of
Greece into the EEC. This did not mean that Greece immediately became a
functional EEC member. Throughout the 1980s Greece was considered by many
to be the bête noire of the Community.2
With the exception of the 1989–93 interlude, PASOK governments under
Andreas Papandreou and Konstantinos Simitis led Greece’s steps inside the
European Union from 1981 to 2004. While many would argue that, due to
Papandreou’s populist policies, Greece lost a crucial chance in the 1980s to
modernize its state and economy with EEC aid following the example of other
poor member states such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland, Greece’s democratic
consolidation was secured through EEC membership. In his second adminis-
tration from 1993 to 1995, Papandreou did show a more pro-European stance,
although he was not able to follow the catalytic developments in Europe, the
collapse of the Soviet Union, war in the Western Balkans and democratization in
East Central Europe. Its relapse to an old-fashioned nationalist stance appeased
the public opinion but had considerable consequences regarding Greece’s
international image and regional role. It was his successor Konstantinos Simitis
2 George Pagoulatos, ‘Believing in national exceptionalism: ideas and economic divergence in
Southern Europe’, West European Politics, 27(1), 2004, pp. 55–57.
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who assumed power in January 1996 that overcame the nationalist legacy of
Andreas Papandreou and addressed Greek national interests through the
acceleration of Greece’s European integration.
A major crisis in Greek–Turkish relations over the sovereignty of the
Imia/Kardak islets underlined the need for an urgent reconfiguration of Greek
strategic objectives. Setting the target of membership in the EMU and Greece’s
membership in the ‘hard core’ of the European Union, Simitis turned Greek
centre-left into the avant-garde of Greek EU federalism and put the ND, the party
which had spearheaded the process in the mid-1970s, into an awkward position.
He provided Greece with a new strategic vision called ‘strong Greece’ (ischyri
Ellada) which projected the country as ‘a European country of the Balkans and
not as a Balkan country of Europe’, a leader of the economic and political reform
process in South-eastern Europe and an unyielding supporter of the European
integration of all neighbouring states. Simitis argued that a ‘strong Greece’ could
only be possible with a robust Greek economy. This required a radical departure
from PASOK’s distributionist legacy, fiscal discipline, control of inflation,
structural reform including privatization, as well as introduction of the euro. In a
speech at the Greek Parliament, Simitis outlined the main pillars of his policy as
follows:
. . . Our equal participation in the process of European integration. This provides
the means so our country can meet the challenge of globalisation, be competitive,
support self-sustained development and improve living conditions. . . . The
modernisation of the country, changes in the way our society operates to create
more opportunities and capabilities for citizens . . . to achieve more social justice
and cohesion. . . . Our leading role in the Balkans. This is the way to offset our
geographic isolation from the centres of the European Union. . . . And, finally, the
defence of our national causes and rights. . . .
The voice of the Greek government is prestigious and persuasive. We have
proved that through hard, systematic and effective work, Greece can claim the
position it deserves in Europe. . . . We are no more the country of deficits,
retrogression, of Hellenocentric isolationist self-reflection. We have proved that we
are not a country which constantly asks for understanding for its special
conditions and argues on the basis of its underdevelopment. . . . 3
This strategic vision comprised a radical departure from the third-worldist
PASOK legacy of the 1970s and 1980s and brought the party much closer to the
policy framework which characterized European social democratic parties in the
aftermath of the cold war.4 Greek economic elites were assigned the task of
leading regional economic integration by gaining key influence in the economies
of Greece’s economic hinterland. This new strategic role necessitated the
acceleration and completion of Europeanization reforms within Greece which
had been delayed for years due to their perceived domestic political cost. More
significantly the government achieved the entrance of Greece into the Euro-zone
in 1999 and contributed to a historic improvement of Greek–Turkish relations.
3 Konstantinos Simitis, ‘Speech to the Plenary Session of the Hellenic Parliament on the 1998
Budget’, 21 December 1997, pp. 21–28.
4 Michalis Spourdalakis and Chrisanthos Tassis, ‘Party change in Greece and the vanguard role of
Pasok’, South European Society & Politics, 11(3/4), 2006, pp. 503–504.
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Significant improvements in the legal protection of minority and immigrant
rights were also to be noted. The infamous Article 19 of the Greek
Citizenship Code which allowed for the stripping of minority members from
their Greek citizenship was abolished. In the field of economic policy, a clear shift
from previous PASOK policies was noted. Fiscal discipline was furthered and
privatization gained pace.5 A rally in the Athens stock exchange was indicative of
strong economic and social optimism. This marked a clear departure from older
PASOK policies which prioritized statist economic policies over privatization
and assimilation over minority and immigrant rights.
This is not to say that there were no shortcomings in the political performance
of the Simitis administration. Its utter failure to implement the long-needed and
planned reform of the social security system,6 accomplish the economic recovery
and privatization of virtually bankrupt state-controlled companies such as
Olympic Airways moderated the success of the Simitis government. The PASOK
government proved unable to make hard but necessary decisions to deal with the
needed structural reforms of the Greek economy. The social security reform was
extensively discussed in the late 1990s, but the proposed reform measures were
shelved as soon as they would meet fierce reaction from labour unions and public
opinion including a large part of the electoral base of PASOK. Last but not least,
corruption charges which became increasingly compelling in the late years of the
Simitis administration reduced the popularity of PASOK and paved the ground
for a wide ND victory in the 2004 elections. These outlined the limits of PASOK’s
transformation but should not obfuscate the major steps made which had a
crucial effect on the Europeanization of Greek economic and foreign policy.
The centre-left maintained a dominant position in Greek politics from 1981 to
2004, and won power again in 2009. However, this became possible due to its
responsiveness to the new international and domestic political circumstances.
Despite its anti-Western, anti-imperialist rhetoric of the 1970s, PASOK was able to
realize that the Greek national interest was full and effective participation in the
EEC. In the 1990s, when Greece got entangled in a serious domestic political
crisis and looked like a part of the Balkan problem rather than a part of its
solution, it was PASOK again under the Simitis administration which failed to
fall prey to nationalist and populist sirens and put forward Greece’s full
participation in the European EMU. This adaptability was a crucial element for
the dominant position of the Greek centre-left and could be attributed to the
foresight of its leaders. PASOK was able to increase its appeal to more educated
and richer segments of Greek society.7
Leadership of the Greek centre-left was one of the main reasons for its successful
transformations. Both Andreas Papandreou and Konstantinos Simitis were able to
foresee the country’s—and the party’s—long-term interest and distance themselves
from declared political promises which would forestall Greece’s European
integration. Despite the disappointment of a part of the PASOK’s electoral base
and membership, both leaders were able to further their pro-integration agenda.
5 George Pagoulatos, ‘The politics of privatisation: redrawing the public–private boundary’, West
European Politics, 28(2), 2005, pp. 371–376.
6 Kevin Featherstone, Georgios Kazamias and Dimitris Papadimitriou, ‘The limits of external
empowerment: Greece, EMU and pension reform’, Political Studies, 49(3), 2001, pp. 471–474.
7 Ilias Nicolacopoulos, ‘Elections and voters, 1974–2004: old cleavages and new issues’, West
European Politics, 28(2), 2005, p. 277.
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This allowed the party to successfully adapt to the changes brought about by the end
of the cold war, globalization and European integration. Dealing with the question
of nationalism was also of paramount importance. In the early PASOK years,
Andreas Papandreou had maintained a nationalist stance in all Greek foreign policy
issues repeating that ‘Greece belongs to the Greeks’ and that national sovereignty
and independence are foundation pillars of PASOK’s policy.8 The Simitis
administration distanced itself radically from that legacy. While still paying
lip service to old slogans and rhetoric, the Simitis administration attempted to break
old nationalist taboos on issues relating to Greek foreign and security policy. The
rapprochement with Turkey had a central position in that respect. In the 1999
European Council summit in Helsinki, Greece lifted its objections to Turkey gaining
EU candidate status, in return for setting a framework which could facilitate the
resolution of both the Cyprus question and the bilateral Greek–Turkish disputes by
2004. This fundamental shift of Greek foreign policy regarding EU–Turkey relations
was followed by a redefinition of Greek national interest. Greek national interest
against neighbours was no more understood in zero-sum game terms. Greece
aspired to assist the development, stability and European integration of its
neighbours aiming to benefit from the fruits of that development as a key regional
economic player, as well as from the ‘peace dividend’, the national resources which
could be diverted from defence expenditures as a result of the resolution of long-
standing conflicts.
The peculiarities of centre-left politics in Turkey: the historical context
The 1970s constitutes a useful starting point for a comparative analysis of the
contrasting fortunes of centre-left politics in Greece and Turkey. The CHP
reached the peak of its electoral success under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit in
the elections of 1974. The CHP emerged as the dominant partner in the coalition
governments of the late 1970s. Yet, this unusual success proved to be short-lived.
The late 1970s was a highly unstable era in Turkish politics. A major economic
and political crisis in the late 1970s peaked with the military coup of September
1980 which led to the exclusion of the CHP from Turkish politics. The 1970s also
constitutes an interesting era in terms of highlighting the contrasting
Europeanization experiences of the two countries, as well as similarities in the
policies of PASOK and CHP. PASOK during this period was firmly against Greek
membership of the European Community, which was identified with Western
imperialist and capitalist interests. Yet unlike in the Greek case, CHP opposition
exacted a toll on EEC–Turkey relations. In October 1978, the Ecevit government
froze EEC–Turkey relations exactly at the time Greece was speeding up its efforts
for full EEC membership. The 1980 coup dealt the strongest blow against
EEC–Turkey relations and led to the suspension of the Europeanization process
in Turkey.
The 1980s and the 1990s represented an era of increasing decline and
marginalization of social democracy in Turkey. During this period, even though
centre-left parties participated in different coalition governments at certain times,
they progressively lost their electoral support, class alliances and linkages with
8 Papandreou’s January 1987 attempt to promote Greek–Turkey detente with Turgut Özal at
Davos was only a short-lived exception which confirmed the rule.
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society. This process reached a climax with the 1999 parliamentary elections, in
which the CHP failed to reach the 10 per cent electoral threshold and found itself
outside the Parliament.
At the heart of the steady decline and marginalization of the CHP during the
1990s was the impact of the 1980 coup on Turkish social democracy. The closure
of the established political parties of the pre-1980 era including the CHP by the
interim military government and its anti-democratic and national security-based
strategy to de-politicize society together have generated a negative impact on
centre-left politics. Increasing splits within the centre-left have also contributed
to the CHP’s decline. Particularly striking in this context was the challenge posed
by the emergence of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi—DSP)
under the leadership of the CHP’s previous leader, Bülent Ecevit, as a more
nationalistically inclined alternative. This has constituted a major split on the
centre-left axis of Turkish politics, resulting in the fragmentation of the social
democratic vote. The reduction of social democratic politics into intra-party
politics of the CHP and the failure of the party to respond effectively to strong
societal demands for social justice and participation have caused both the
growing detachment of Turkish social democracy from society and the increasing
disenchantment of society towards the identity and ideology of the CHP. In this
period, politics of the centre-left has been increasingly reduced to a contest over
leadership and power politics within the party.9 Thus, in addition to the major
splits in the centre-left during the 1980s and the 1990s, what we observe is a
serious decline in the credibility and persuasiveness of the centre-left to present
itself as a viable solution to the serious structural problems of Turkish society.
The post-1980 period has, in fact, given rise to a serious crisis of state-centrism;
‘the legitimacy once enjoyed has been withdrawn in the eyes of the Turkish society
at large, its democracy deficit has steadily increased, the national development-
alism has been seriously challenged and replaced by neo-liberal economic
rationality’.10 Its secular national identity has been criticized and attacked by the
resurgence of Islam. Its homogeneous vision of society has been challenged in
ethnic terms by the rise of the Kurdish question. Its top-down mode of governing
has been exposed to calls for democratization from civil society organizations and
civil initiatives, and its uni-dimensional, security-based foreign policy has
become inadequate in coping effectively with the increasingly complex and multi-
dimensional international challenges.11
Since the 1980s and especially during the 1990s, both the changing
international context, described as the processes of globalization, and radical
transformations that have been occurring in Turkish society together have
generated important challenges to the state-centric Turkish modernization,
dismantling its very foundations and leading to its gradual demise. The changing
nature of Turkish modernization and its ever increasing exposure to
globalization constitute the historical basis for the decline of the CHP in terms
9 Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, ‘The Republican People’s Party’, Turkish Studies, 3(1), 2002, pp. 102–121.
10 Çağlar Keyder, ‘Whither the project of modernity? Turkey in the 1990s’, in Sibel Bozdoğan and
Reşat Kasaba (eds), Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, University of Washington
Press, Seattle and London, 1997, pp. 37–51.
11 Fuat Keyman, Türkiye ve Radikal Demokrasi, Alfa, İstanbul, 2001.
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of its social support, its ideological persuasiveness and its organic ties with
society.12
Ironically, the CHP’s failure to cross the threshold in the 1999 elections turned
out to be a blessing-in-disguise as the party escaped scorn for the 2001 economic
crisis, which severely hit Turkey’s established political parties. In the November
2002 elections, the CHP could not match the electoral success of the Justice and
Development Party, the AKP, a new centre-right party of Islamist origin, but
nevertheless, became the only opposition party to enter the Parliament.13 In the post-
election period, the fortunes of the two principal parties, the AKP and the CHP,
diverged even further. In contrast to the proactive stance adopted by the ruling
party, the AKP, on Turkey’s key political issues such as relations with the European
Union, the attitude of the CHP leadership appeared largely defensive and negative.
Certainly, there was a false expectation on the part of key CHP figures that the AKP,
given its Islamist heritage, would sooner or later find itself in confrontation with the
state elites resulting in its ultimate closure as was the case with its predecessors the
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi—RP) and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi—FP). One
could detect a failure here on the part of the CHP to recognize the adaptability and
the learning process experienced by moderate Islamists in Turkey, as well the
transformation of Turkish society since the 1980s.
In contrast to the very cosmopolitanism of the AKP, the CHP appeared to
pursue a hyper-nationalist course. Regarding democratization, the party elites
have tended to establish causality between democracy and secularism which
resulted in recognizing the military as a necessary guardian of the state against
possible violation of the principle of secularism. Whilst the commitment of the
CHP to secularism was well-founded, its strict or hard-line interpretation of
secularism hardly left any avenue for democratic opening in the direction of
extending the realm of politics for religious freedoms. In CHP’s view, democracy
was conditioned by secularism and not vice versa. The party missed an
important opportunity to present a major challenge to the ruling party by
prioritizing a narrow understanding of secularism over democracy.
Hence, the dominant vision of the CHP in the public mind and in key
international circles was that of a defensive, inward-looking party that lacked the
kind of democratic and reformist credentials to tackle Turkey’s serious economic
and political challenges. Ironically, the conservative position adopted by the CHP
on key domestic and foreign policy issues resulted in its legitimacy problem. This,
in turn, has helped to increase the AKP’s societal and international support
leading to the aggravation of the asymmetry in the electoral fortunes of the two
parties. Moreover, what was also striking was the lack of concern on the part of the
CHP with the economic domain, centring its attention instead entirely on cultural,
political and security-related issues with a heavy focus on secularism and the
Cyprus issues. With respect to these two central issues, the position adopted by the
party was quite unconstructive and clearly failed to take into account the changing
public opinion. On the Cyprus issue, for example, the party’s position opposed a
compromise solution at any cost. Nevertheless its notions of national interest,
12 Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, ‘Globalization and social democracy in the European periphery:
paradoxes of the Turkish experience’, Globalizations, 4(2), 2007, pp. 211–228.
13 Ziya Öniş and E. F. Keyman, ‘Turkey at the polls: a new path emerges’, Journal of Democracy,
14(2), 2003.
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sovereignty and security appeared to be seriously outdated. Indeed, there was no
attempt to take into account changing public opinion on this issue, notably the
outcome of the elections in northern Cyprus itself that clearly signalled popular
demands in the direction of an internationally acceptable solution. It was also
interesting that as a social democratic alternative, the party failed to place key
issues such as the performance of local government and the need to fight endemic
corruption as its central priorities. The outcome of these strategic errors was to
marginalize the CHP even further in the electoral process both in the municipal
elections of 2004 and the general election of 2007.14
Explaining the current impasse of social democratic politics in Turkey: the
problem of path dependence and the role of agency
The current impasse of social democracy in Turkey is a multi-dimensional
phenomenon and the collective outcome of several influences. Certainly, the
current stance of the CHP reflects the legacies of the single party era of the inter-
war period. The CHP of the early Kemalist era was closely associated with a
certain type of top-down, state-centric modernization based on a particular
understanding of ‘secularism’ and ‘national identity’.15 This historical
association with the Kemalist modernization project has had the unfortunate
repercussion of making it rather insensitive to demands for recognition on the
basis of religious or ethnic identity. Indeed, the party leadership increasingly
conceived of its mission as stabilizing or protecting the basic founding principles
of the Turkish Republic at all cost. Regime stabilization as opposed to electoral
success under a normal parliamentary democratic regime emerged as the
overriding concern for the party leadership, particularly as the general elections
of 2007 approached. The emphasis placed on regime stability also had a parallel
influence in terms of contributing to growing Euro-scepticism in spite of the fact
that the party has historically associated with the goal of Westernization—a
natural corollary of which is EU membership. The CHP of the recent era has
increasingly been characterized by its ‘defensive nationalism’ which has made it
heavily sceptical of EU conditionality on the grounds that some of the key
EU-sponsored reforms would undermine the unity and secular character of the
Turkish state and contribute towards a dual process of partition of the Turkish
state and Islamization of Turkish society.
An increasing requirement of electoral success in democratic regimes is that
political parties of centre-left or of centre-right origin need to extend their
horizons beyond class-based politics and appeal to a wide range of interests in
order to obtain a large share of the popular vote. Class-based politics or
appealing to certain specific segments of society is simply not a good strategy if a
political party is at all interested in building successful electoral coalitions.
Historically, the CHP has been rather ineffective in its attempts to build broad,
cross-class coalitions. Only in the 1970s, under the premiership of Bülent Ecevit,
did the CHP actually manage to achieve major success in terms of building
broad-based societal support. In the Turkish context, conservative parties of the
14 Sinan Ciddi, ‘The Republican People’s Party and the 2007 General Elections: the politics of
perpetual decline?’, Turkish Studies, 9(3), 2008, pp. 437–455.
15 Bozdoğan and Kasaba (eds), Rethinking Modernity, op. cit.
266 Z. Öniş and I. N. Grigoriadis
centre-right have been much more prosperous in this respect as the successive
experiences of the Democratic Party led by Menderes in the 1950s, the Justice
Party (Adalet Partisi—AP) led by Süleyman Demirel in the late 1960s and the early
1970s, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi—ANAP) led by Turgut Özal in the
1980s and, finally, the AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan clearly testify. Centre-
right parties effectively managed to appeal to both religious and nationalist
sentiments of society at large. They have also managed to make business, both
large and small, an integral component of a broad-based electoral coalition. The
CHP, in contrast, has had limited success even in terms of its attempts to bring
small- and medium-sized business interests into the party’s electoral coalition.
All these factors have sustained an image of an elitist party, a party of bureaucrats
and intellectuals, rather detached from society at large.
Yet another structural influence concerns the nature of the welfare state and
the nature of organized labour in Turkey. Unlike its Western European
counterparts, the welfare state has been underdeveloped in the Turkish context
and unionized labour has constituted a small element of the overall workforce.
A significant proportion of the population has been located in rural areas and
employed in agricultural activities. All these factors have placed centre-left
parties in a disadvantageous position in the Turkish context. In any case, labour
unions, which reached the peak of their influence in the 1970s, have been
increasingly weakened and marginalized during the post-1980 era of neo-liberal
globalization. This, in turn, made the job of an allegedly centre-left party even
more difficult. Admittedly, the labour unions have also been on the defensive in
Western European democracies during the neo-liberal period. Yet, they
continued to be far more influential than has been the case in the Turkish context.
Military coups in Turkey, notably the coup of 1980, have also had a
devastating impact in terms of fragmenting and de-institutionalizing the Turkish
party system. Arguably, the effects of the 1980 coup on centre-left politics have
been more profound compared to its effects on the centre-right. All the major
political parties of the pre-1980 era, namely, the AP, the CHP, and the National
Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi—MSP) were closed down following the
military coup of September 1980. Furthermore, the leaders of these parties
Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit and Necmettin Erbakan were banned from
participating in active politics for the course of the next decade. This has clearly
had the effect of a major rupture or discontinuity in terms of its impact of the
institutional evolution and the maturation of the Turkish party system. Yet, the
centre-right certainly proved to be far more adaptable with Turgut Özal’s ANAP,
a natural successor to the AP of the earlier era, emerging as the leading party in
the November elections of 1983, following the end of the military interlude and
the return to democracy. Centre-left politics was among the prime targets of the
military intervention and the ensuing authoritarian Constitution of 1982
provided restricted space for left-wing politics, not only by its vigorous
repression in the party political realm but also through the repression of leftist
intellectuals and restrictions placed over the activities of organized labour.
Centre-left politics in Turkey has been clearly on the defensive during the course
of the 1980s and the 1990s. Several parties have emerged which describe
themselves as centre-left or social democratic, including the leader-dominated
party of Bülent Ecevit’s DSP and the Social Democratic Populist Party
(Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi—SHP) led by Erdal İnönü. Both of these parties
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managed to become partners in coalition governments at different times, the
former between 1999 and 2002 and the latter during the early 1990s. But these
different manifestations of centre-left politics were able to obtain only around 20
per cent of the total vote and have clearly failed to replicate the electoral success
of the CHP in the 1970s. Indeed, the CHP itself could only emerge under its
conventional name in the mid-1990s, and once again become an important force
in Turkish politics as the principal opposition party as recently as 2002.
Structural explanations and the problem of path-dependence are important
but can only provide part of the explanation. A complete explanation also needs
to take sufficient account of the role of agency and more specifically the role of
leadership. The CHP leadership, in stark contrast to its Greek counterpart,
PASOK, failed to break away from the domestic historical legacies and take
advantage of the opportunities provided by the global and regional structural
context. In the post-2002 context, attempts to move the party in a more
cosmopolitan reformist direction by opposition groups led by Kemal Derviş and
his associates were marginalized. The attempt of İsmail Cem, a former Foreign
Minister and senior member of the DSP to form a reformist centre-left party, the
New Turkey Party (YTP) failed to change Turkey’s political map. The party had a
dismal performance in the November 2002 elections, collecting only 1.2 per cent
of the vote. Soon after, the party was dissolved, and Cem joined the ranks of the
CHP. The tight organizational structure of the party and absence of intra-party
democracy facilitated this marginalization process and contributed to the
extraordinary dominance of the party leader, Deniz Baykal, in the process. To the
surprise of many both at home and abroad, the leadership of the AKP proved to
be much more flexible and adaptable in its response to the opportunity space
provided by the changing domestic, regional and global context.
Turning our attention to the global context, there is no doubt that the process
of world-wide neo-liberal restructuring from the early 1980s onwards has left
social democratic parties in a difficult position. The possibilities for sustaining the
welfare state in its existing form ceased to be a viable alternative even in
advanced industrialized countries of Europe. Nevertheless, neo-liberal globali-
zation also helped to create a sizable group of ‘winners’ which could be
effectively incorporated into the broad electoral coalition of a centre-left party.
The experiences of ‘third way’ style political parties in Europe such as New
Labour under Tony Blair and SPD under Gerhard Schröder demonstrated that
social democrats could achieve significant electoral success.16 The key for this
was the modification of their strategies which involved an attempt to come to
terms with market-friendly strategies and the reform, redefinition and
decentralization of the welfare state and new thinking based on a broader
understanding of inequality incorporating its ‘material redistribution’ and
‘recognition’ dimensions. The prospect of EU membership and the associated set
of democratization reforms provided a major opportunity space for a European
third way-style social democratic party in Turkey from the late 1990s onwards.
The crisis of Turkish modernity and the rising demands for recognition based on
Islamic or Kurdish identity as well as the growing strength of the civil society
helped to extend this opportunity space. Yet, ironically it was the AKP, a
16 On this, see Donald Sassoon (ed.), Looking Left: European Socialism after the Cold War, I. B. Tauris,
London, 1997.
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centre-right party of Islamist origin and not the CHP which has effectively
capitalized on this new opportunity space.
CHP versus PASOK: the principal contrasts
Shifting attitudes regarding modernization comprise an interesting point of
contrast between PASOK and the CHP. According to Diamandouros, Greek
modernization came about as a result of a clash between a reformist and an
underdog culture.17 Western-inspired and willing to break away with tradition,
the reformist culture had been represented by secular urban elites throughout the
19th century and found in the early 20th century its best representative in
Eleftherios Venizelos. This culture was countered by a culture characterized by a
vigorous belief in redistributionist policies, national exceptionalism, prioritiza-
tion of a narrowly defined national interest and a conspiracy-driven under-
standing of international politics. This ‘underdog’ culture strongly resonated with
dominant public opinion views in the 1970s and shaped PASOK’s worldview and
political programme. Yet in the course of 20 years, PASOK underwent such a
transformation that by the late 1990s it became the staunchest representative of
the reformist culture in the Greek context. In the case of Turkey, a similar division
could be observed in the early years of Atatürk’s reform. The CHP was the reform
party par excellence, aiming to implement Atatürk’s Westernization programme
and sever Turkey’s links with its Ottoman and Islamic past. In Turkey the
‘underdog’ culture was represented by forces which opposed Turkey’s
Westernization underlining its non-Western identity. This culture was best
represented in the ‘Just Order (Adil Düzen)’ political programme of the historic
leader of Turkish political Islam Necmettin Erbakan. Yet following the deep socio-
economic changes which Turkey underwent in the 1980s, a reverse process was
observed. While a majority current within Turkish political Islam was able to shift
from the underdog to the reformist camp, the CHP moved to the reverse direction.
It came to represent those elements of Turkey’s secularist elite which failed to
adapt to the new environment defined by globalization and Turkey’s steps
towards European integration. The culmination of Turkey’s Westernization
process, namely, its EU membership, was seen with outright suspicion, as
democratic consolidation also meant the end of tutelary privileges enjoyed by the
country’s secularist elite. Increasing emphasis on a narrow definition of national
interest and defence of the status quo even at the expense of human rights and
social peace did not allude to a social democratic party but rather reminded of the
interwar authoritarian statist legacy of the CHP. Thus the CHP ended
up appropriating a statist, pro-status-quo version of the underdog culture.
At the risk of oversimplifying, perhaps the most striking difference between
the political parties is that PASOK stands as a ‘party of government’ whereas the
CHP can be described as the ‘party of the state’. PASOK has been in office for a
period of more than 20 years and is used to be a natural candidate for office. In
contrast, the history of the CHP is characterized by two dramatically different
phases. During the single party era, the CHP was the political arm of the
Kemalist ruling elite and, hence, the natural party of government.
17 Diamandouros, op. cit.
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Once the transition to multi-party democracy was accomplished in 1950, the role
of the party changed to the position of a quasi-permanent opposition party in a
political environment dominated by parties on the centre-right of the political
spectrum. It was only in the mid-1970s under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit
could the CHP mobilize itself in such a way as to win a large share of the total
vote and emerge as the leading party in the country. Even then, however, the
votes generated were not enough to generate a majority in the Parliament.
The CHP found itself in a difficult position of forming a coalition with right-wing
parties. Indeed, the period during which the CHP has managed to emerge as a
serious contender for political power proved to be short-lived. The economic
crisis of the late 1970s and the subsequent military coup of September 1980
embodied disastrous consequences not only for the party itself, but for the social
democratic movement in Turkey in general. Arguably, this strange mix of being
the natural party of government during a critical phase of Turkish modernization
followed by a new role of a quasi-permanent opposition party for most of the
post-war era has left a deep imprint on the mind-set of the party leadership which
perhaps explains the attitudes of Baykal and his associates during the most
recent era.
Lessons of the Greek experience for the Turkish context and the limits of
comparative analysis
One of the major lessons of the PASOK experience has been that shifting
from distributionist definitions of social justice may indeed not have punitive
electoral effects. In fact, it may form the basis of a wider political alliance
including the political centre, if it entails a more comprehensive definition of
social justice. Social justice was not understood as simply distribution of benefits
to the weaker parts of the society or to the party clientele, but was directly linked
with policies aiming to promote economic growth and competitiveness, which
would allow the implementation of social policy based on created surplus and
not debt. This means that a social democratic party need no more be a party of the
weak but a party of those who aim to achieve harmonious social and economic
development and further social policies, which would not undermine policies
aiming to achieve fiscal stability and economic growth. In the case of Greece,
improvement of the country’s economic performance was achieved alongside the
acceleration of a privatization programme and increasing integration to global
economy.
Moreover, centre-left parties do not need to totally disengage from
nationalism, but can contribute to new definitions of national interest, more
compatible with globalization and European integration. Redefining national
interest in light of the new political conditions set by the end of the cold war,
Greece’s participation in the European Union and the need to promote
Europeanization in the Balkans allowed PASOK to divert Greek nationalism
from long-standing regional disputes to the vision of a new ‘strong Greece’,
willing to share its political stability and economic prosperity with its neighbours
and base its leading regional role on these. Greek national interest was understood
in ‘win–win’ terms with the country’s neighbours. This facilitated efforts for the
resolution of long-standing disputes.
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The profound transformation of PASOK notably during the course of the
1990s contains some interesting implications for the current Turkish experience.
The first lesson is that the ongoing Europeanization process constitutes a
powerful dynamic force which also helps to transform a heavily nationalistic,
inward-oriented and defensive social democratic movement to a more
globalization-friendly, Western European style social democratic movement
over time. Hence, the current state of the CHP does not necessarily represent a
long-term, sustainable equilibrium position. At the same time, however, change
is a slow and highly painful process, and the PASOK experience is quite striking
in this respect in the sense that resistance has continued, even though Greece
joined the European Community at a relatively early stage in 1981. The second
major lesson is that structural factors alone are unable to account for this change.
Leadership matters. It was the critical leadership of Simitis which was
instrumental in the transformation of Greek social democracy which, in turn,
played an extremely critical and constructive role in the adaptation of the Greek
economy and political system to European norms in the late 1990s. This suggests
that Turkey may also experience a similar phase in the future where a
leadership change in the CHP could play a significant transformative role. The
third broad lesson is that social democracy contributed to the European
transformation process of Greece and at the same it has also been transformed
itself as part of the ongoing Europeanization dynamic. This implies that social
democracy becomes both a subject and object of democratization. Clearly, these
broad lessons create a certain bias towards optimism concerning the future
trajectories of social democracy and the Europeanization process in Turkey.
At the same time, however, one ought to be aware of the fact that there are
certain limits to the possible lessons one could draw from the Greek experience
for the Turkish context. Social democracy in Greece has been able to capitalize on
the fact that Greece has historically a much more cohesive social structure than
Turkey. Greece’s defeat in the 1919–22 Greek–Turkish war led to territorial losses
and a population exchange which left it smaller but very homogeneous.
Cleavages in Turkey along the lines of ethnic and religious identity in the Turkish
context have remained far more pronounced. These cleavages, in turn render the
task of any social democratic party in Turkey far more problematic than is the
case in Greece. Despite the key role of the Orthodox Church in Greek political life,
secularization and the role of religion in the Greek public sphere have not
comprised ground for contestation as in the case of Turkey. Similarly, the
minority problem in the Turkish context, notably but not exclusively in relation to
the identity claims of the sizeable Kurdish minority in Turkish society, has no
direct counterpart in the Greek context. Immigration into Greece and the
associated problem of integrating minorities into the main fabric of Greek society
has emerged as an important social and political problem since the end of the
Cold War. Yet, the problem is clearly not comparable in terms of its scale and
intensity to the problem of integrating minorities and notably the Kurdish
minority in the Turkish context.
Yet another issue that makes a comparison between PASOK and CHP
somewhat problematic concerns the differences in the Europeanization
experiences of the two countries. The fact that Greece attained Community at
a relatively early stage in 1981 provided an environment to the transformation of
centre-left politics in Greece. In Turkey, the Europeanization process and the
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question of EU membership has remained a hotly contested issue. Furthermore,
Turkey’s European identity continues to be a matter of intense debate in public
deliberations as is clearly evident from the recent constitutional debate and its
poor results. The decision to include or exclude Turkey is part and parcel of a
parallel debate on the future course of the European integration project itself.
Clearly such debates have negative repercussions in Turkey itself contributing to
the process whereby anti-EU and anti-reform elements gain an upper hand, and
pro-EU and pro-reform elements finding themselves very much on the defensive.
Indeed, following a Golden Age period of 2002–2005, the Europeanization
process in Turkey appears to be at a stalemate and this provides a rather
unattractive milieu for the kind of transformation of CHP along the lines of a
European style social democratic party replicating the past experience of PASOK
in the process. Parallel to the relative weakness of the Europeanization process,
the fact that democracy is still far from being fully consolidated and the
continuing importance of the military in Turkish politics represent major hurdles
on the path of social democratic transformation in the Turkish context.
Added to the comparative weakness of the momentum and depth of the
Europeanization process in the Turkish context, the current European and global
context also provide a less favourable environment for the transformation of
social democratic politics in Turkey. Third way-style European social democratic
parties in Europe have been very much on the defensive in recent years and have
been losing the electoral stronghold which they had managed to establish across
Western Europe in the late 1990s. The parties in question have been experiencing
a structural problem in the sense that constructing electoral coalitions which
include both winners and losers of the globalization have become progressively
more difficult. In an environment of rising unemployment and fears of
immigration, social democratic parties faced growing competition from far-left
as well as right-wing populist parties, as the recent German experience clearly
testifies with the SPD being forced into a coalition with Christian Democrats.
Similar structural problems have manifested themselves in the Greek context and
have led to the breakdown of the electoral dominance of PASOK since 2004. In
the early years of George Papandreou’s administration, PASOK proved unable to
defend Simitis’ legacy and suffered severe electoral losses both to its left and
right. This was underlined in the September 2007 parliamentary elections, when
the ND scored an easy victory by collecting 41.83 per cent, while PASOK
collected only 38.1 per cent, almost 2.5 per cent less than in the 2004 elections.
PASOK’s electoral fortunes changed dramatically in the early elections of
October 2009, when it scored a historic victory collecting 43.98 per cent of the
vote, more than 10 per cent than the ND. Yet its success was rather a function of
the failure of the ND administration than the appeal of its own political
programme. The current global economic crisis will make the job of any social
democratic party especially in terms of pursuing a redistribution-based social
policy agenda exceedingly difficult. Even if such parties manage to win elections
as a reaction to the failures of the incumbent parties, the scope for success will be
considerably restricted compared to the much more favourable global liquidity
environment which ruled during the early part of the decade. All these
considerations suggest that the PASOK-style transformation of the CHP could be
a much more painful and lengthy process, given the constraints imposed by the
current European and international context.
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Concluding observations: looking towards the future
The comparison of PASOK and CHP can provide useful conclusions for the
reform steps which could bring the Turkish centre-left to the front stage of
Turkish politics. To be successful social democratic parties need to become
responsive to political and economic developments and readjust their strategies.
On the economic side, finding solutions on how to achieve higher rates of
economic growth and fairly distribute the national income is the true crux of
centre-left politics today. Widening the political agenda, increasing electoral
appeal beyond disenfranchised political groups towards the political centre and
expanding their political programme beyond redistribution issues to address
economic development and growth are some useful implications of the policy.
Solid commitment to democratic values and embracing immigrants and
minorities, which form a substantial part of the disenfranchised in contemporary
Western societies, is also imperative. Adopting a more tolerant approach towards
diverse cultures not only befits social democratic ideals but also proves to be a
smart political strategy. This can assure the leading role of social democratic
parties in the changing conditions of European politics.
In particular, the experience of PASOK is a telling example of how social
democratic parties in the era of globalization can display resilience to change
and display unusual adaptive capacity to changing environments at the same
time. PASOK’s transformation under Simitis involved a new understanding of
the national which was much more in tune with globalization. The new and
transformed PASOK displayed a stout commitment to democratic values and a
more multicultural approach based on a novel understanding of the weak and
the poor which included minorities and immigrants. The PASOK experience
also clearly highlights the fact that an effective social agenda continues to be an
integral element of contemporary social democracy. Yet, social agenda cannot
simply be reduced to class-based redistribution from capital to labour. The
recognition element also constitutes a key element of a broader understanding of
redistribution. The PASOK experience also highlights how a social democratic
party was both transformed by the ongoing Europeanization process and
also became a leading contributor to the deepening of the Europeanization
process. These observations could generate a certain degree of optimism
concerning the current impasse of centre-left politics in Turkey and suggest that
the present stalemate does not necessarily represent a permanent or sustainable
equilibrium.
Turning to the Turkish context, the CHP of the post-2002 era is rather
reminiscent of PASOK in the late 1970s, whereas it was the ruling party, the AKP,
which despite its strong conservative roots, displayed the kind of adaptability to
changing domestic and external conditions, displaying significant parallels with
the transformed PASOK of the 1990s. Engagement and dialogue are much better
recipes for overcoming the current polarized state of Turkish politics and Turkish
society. At a time when the AKP has lost much of its reformist dynamism and its
steadfast pro-European orientation, the CHP could still go through a PASOK-line
transformation over time and establish itself as a major force in Turkey’s
revitalized Europeanization process. The obstacles on the path of such
transformation, both domestic and external, are quite formidable and change,
if it ever takes place, will be a lengthy and protracted process.
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